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This article discusses anthropology‟s current mainstream understandings of 
development and offers a historical materialist alternative. According to these, 
development was and is either a discourse-backed anti-politics machine that 
strengthens the power of postcolonial governments or a category of practice, a 
universal that generates frictions when it clashes with local historical-cultural 
formations. The approach proposed here reintegrates the analysis of development 
into the anthropological analysis of capitalism‟s uneven and contested histories and 
practices. A reassessment of World Bank reporting on Lesotho and an analysis of the 
Bank‟s impact on the wider policies of development in postcolonial Mauritius, one of 
the 20th century‟s pre-eminent success stories of capitalist development, underlines 
that development is best understood as a political economy machinery that maintains 
and amends contested capitalist practices in an encounter with earlier global, 
national, and local historical-cultural formations.   
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 2 
Introduction – Development, History and Practice  
 
When James Ferguson identified World Bank funded development programs in post-
colonial Lesotho as an “anti-politics machine”, he established a new paradigm in the 
anthropology of development (Ferguson 1990). His work revealed that a false history 
of isolation from global trade stood at the cradle of the World Bank‟s production of 
knowledge about Lesotho. This was backed by a powerful Foucauldian discourse, a 
regime of truth that portrayed development in general and international organizations 
in particular as objective and neutral – programs and projects were supposedly 
dealing with technical issues and concerned with bettering the livelihoods of the 
inhabitants of a given place. This way, development could appear as something 
outside of the realm of politics. Unveiling that discourse, Ferguson showed how 
World Bank development projects in Lesotho failed to achieve their “official” aim and 
instead consolidated the nation state‟s grip on a given region (Ferguson 1990:251-
275). In other words, World Bank and other international organizations‟ development 
programs in Lesotho and beyond were, to Ferguson, an anti-politics machine that 
produced political facts. 
As happens with all paradigms, anthropologists have since pointed out the anti-
politics machine‟s limitations. Gerhard Anders, for example, argued that World Bank 
structural adjustment programs and their insistence on good governance in 1990s 
Malawi (Anders 2005) did not strengthen but weakened the state. Tania Li‟s 
anthropology of the Indonesian state‟s domestic development programs puts 
emphasis on “the contingent and compromised space of cultural intimacy” as an 
important factor in any “attempt to constitute governable subjects” (Li 1999:295). This 
extends into a critique of the anti-politics machine paradigm‟s discursive approach, 
which is said to commit anthropology to an eternal search for development‟s hidden 
motives (Li 2007). In this spirit, anthropologists now emphasize that development as 
such and the programs and projects led by international and other institutions and 
organizations may well have good intentions. Development therefore should be 
researched from a supposedly more neutral angle, as a “category of practice”.  
This, however, comes at the analytical cost of ignoring the unequal relations that 
development agendas thrive on. The new analyses of practice are supposed to 
reveal that, contrary to Ferguson‟s paradigm, discourses are not all powerful but 
may, like any other structure of power, be manipulated and subverted (Mosse 2013). 
Development is now portrayed as one of several “engaged universals”, which travel 
across “differences” and are thereby “charged and changed” due to the ubiquitous 
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“frictions” that occur when universals hit the ground running. However, that new 
understanding is not particularly novel. Consider that a perspective, which claims that 
development agendas come into effect through processes that bereave them of their 
“promises of universality” (Tsing 2005:8) is very much in line with Ferguson‟s anti-
politics machine trope, where, likewise, the World Bank‟s programs in Lesotho did 
not achieve the development agenda‟s goal to improve local political economies but 
instead strengthened the national state‟s grip on regions. What is more, the new 
anthropologies of development as a category of practice locate the process of friction 
in an interaction of development agendas “with historical-cultural formations of 
identity, rights, and development, which are then in turn „globalized‟ through 
advocacy chains“ (Mosse 2013:232).  
Deliberately or not, there is an implicit reduction taking place here, which 
reintroduces hermeneutics of global (development as universalism) versus local 
(historical-cultural formations of identity, rights, and development) and, at the same 
time, confines the location of anthropological research to the scale of the local where 
universals become engaged. This replicates a general move in anthropology towards 
the Latourian paradigm of “keeping the social flat” by preempting global phenomena 
such as development of the very political economies that they emerge from and seek 
to alter or sustain (Murawski 2016; Kapferer 2005).  
The “historical-cultural formations” that this article is interested in, instead, are crucial 
for an anthropology of development that engages with and discloses how powerful 
development agendas always come in (global) plurals. No matter whether we look at 
the nineteenth century, the twentieth century, or the current century, any given group 
of humans always have more than one promise of universalism to refer to – not least 
when development is at stake. The period since the end of the Second World War, 
for example, saw the rise and decline of a number of capitalist development projects 
– moving from import-substitution to export-oriented development, the rise and 
decline of socialist development projects and the non-aligned movement‟s calls for a 
new international economic order (the contributions in James and Leake 2015: 
provide a good overview). All these global development agendas were about 
changing political economies and did put, for example, large-scale explicit industrial 
or infrastructural projects in place have sustained or reversed opportunities for 
accumulation and exploitation in a given region and/or nation. 
Such large-scale programs and projects have far-reaching impact on human 
sociality. Collaboration, compliance and resistance as much as profit and 
impoverishment loom large when tens of thousands are dispossessed of their land 
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while dams and other infrastructure constructed on that land may change the habitat 
of entire nation-states (Nilsen 2010). Several decades of international and national 
development policies promoting industrialization have established tens of thousands 
of industrial estates and zones across the globe where hundreds of millions of 
workers are exploited each day while multinational corporations are incentivized to 
defy national social-contracts and avoid tax-payments (Neveling 2015a; Strümpell 
2014). At the same time, international organizations themselves are hardly 
homogenous blocs but employees, research groups, national delegations, and other 
individuals and groups usually hold different opinions on policies and may go head-
to-head over individual projects and programs (Shakya 2011).  
What is thus much needed is a perspective that replaces Ferguson‟s anti-politics 
machine with a focus on the political economy machinery that development was and 
is. Section two develops the historical anthropology component of the political 
economy machinery paradigm. Ferguson‟s findings that the World Bank 
misrepresented developing national economies as “aboriginal” and “isolated” rest on 
critiquing a single document, a 1975 World Bank report on Lesotho‟s economy. 
Section two reviews that document to show how Ferguson exaggerated certain 
World Bank statements and factored out the global context of the Cold War and 
decolonization. Once the global historical context is factored in, World Bank reporting 
no longer appears to fabricate historical isolation but to even reflect core demands of 
the non-aligned movement‟s 1970s call for a new international economic order that 
should overcome unequal exchanges in the global economy. Building on these 
insights, I propose a critical anthropology of development that considers capitalism‟s 
various spatial and temporal manifestations. 
Section three applies this anthropology to a central but increasingly forgotten 
category of practicing development - reporting and survey mechanisms. The example 
of Mauritius, a small island in the Indian Ocean that was regarded as a hopeless 
case in the 1950s and became a best-practice example for successful capitalist 
development in the 1980s, brings to light how World Bank country reports and 
surveys were highly concerned with historical dependencies and the legacies of 
empire. Section four then shows that the most significant change in development 
policy, overcoming dependency on sugar as the single export-commodity with the 
opening of an export processing zone, was ushered in by historical-cultural 
formations from within Mauritius. This reveals how international and national actors 
and institutions, with roots sometimes stretching back over centuries, operated and 
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negotiated development policies and related lending instruments in a multi-polar 
global arena.  
The concluding section highlights that postcolonial development involves competing 
historical-cultural formations and that many of these globalized long ago. This 
establishes a new understanding of development as a category of contested 
capitalist practice, as one manifestation of the political economy machinery of 
capitalism and, hence, a struggle over maintaining power relations between capital, 
the nation-state and workers while changing the historical location of postcolonial 
economies and industrial sectors within dynamic regional and global political 
economies.  
 
II. Development and Historical Isolation in Global Perspective 
 
As stated above, Ferguson‟s book on Lesotho is one of the most widely cited 
anthropological analyses of development. It‟s first, and in many ways, foundational 
critique was that a 1975 World Bank report (co-sponsored by the UN‟s Food and 
Agriculture Organization) falsely portrayed Lesotho‟s economy as isolated and 
subsistence-based and thereby defined the rationale for dozens of development 
projects. As the anti-politics machine paradigm gained traction, anthropology came to 
regard fabricated histories as a standard feature of development discourse and 
practice even though Ferguson‟s critique had a single World Bank report as empirical 
sample. Only recently, critiques have pointed out that the anti-politics paradigm 
overcommits anthropology to a constant search for hidden motives (Li 2007). The 
following seeks to move beyond this impasse by re-reading Ferguson‟s solitary 
empirical reference point and by adding an analytical perspective that considers the 
wider geopolitical setting of the 1970s, the competing global models for development 
of the time. 
To Ferguson, the 1975 World Bank report misrepresented independent Lesotho as 
untouched by modern developments and as a “traditional subsistence” economy 
based on agriculture. Contrary to these World Bank findings, Lesotho was “a 
dormitory suburb of peasants who commute back and forth across the border” to 
work in South African mines (Wallman 1969:5, cited in Ferguson 1990: 34). Also, the 
South African mining sector consumed a good share of Lesotho‟s agricultural 
production. The World Bank, however, was committed to ignore Lesotho‟s enclave 
status and its integration into a regional market because its mandate for development 
assistance required a focus on national economies. Images of “aboriginality” and 
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“subsistence agricultural” further supported the requirement that the Bank regarded 
its member-states and clients as neutral, enlightened postcolonial nation-state guided 
by the principle of “governmentality” and aiming at a “great transformation” towards 
industrialization (Ferguson 1990:71-73).  
A re-reading of the 1975 World Bank report reveals, however, that this was, from the 
preamble onward, very explicit about Lesotho‟s historical conditions and regional 
integration. In regard to labor migration it stated, for example, that “[a]t present an 
estimated 60 percent of the male labor force is in South Africa” (World Bank 
1975:xv). Further, the report devoted considerable attention to the history of 
migration, to wage differences between the two countries and to the social costs of 
labor migration, which had “disrupted family lives” in Lesotho. Somewhat culturalist 
undertones, such as the ahistorical statement that migration to the mines in South 
Africa had “penetrated into Lesotho culture” (World Bank 1975:xv), were specified 
with reference to class as the World Bank reporters underlined that poorer families 
were much more likely than rich families to send out migrants. Overall, the report was 
very attentive to the fact that migration was of “critical economic importance” and 
insisted that the Lesotho government should “give as much assistance [...] as 
possible” to migrants affected by ever-stricter South African immigration laws (World 
Bank 1975:e.g. xvii, xx, 7, 21).  
Ferguson not only misinterpreted the report‟s take on migration. His diagnosis of 
fabricated histories of “aboriginality” and “traditional subsistence” agriculture in the 
report rested on declaring that the World Bank surveyors had ignored regional 
integration of Lesotho‟s agriculture in the early 1800s and that they had identified a 
significant decline in agricultural production for the period from 1950 to 1970 based 
on flawed statistics.  
First, regarding Ferguson‟s comment on the use of statistics, it is important to note 
that this refers to secondary literature, which identified the 1949/50 colonial census of 
the Maize crop as an anomaly – an exceptionally good harvest or wrongly calculated 
(Ferguson 1990:50). Such evidence is insufficient to nullify the Bank‟s overall 
concern with a declining agricultural output, however. If the 1949/50 census was 
flawed, the fact remains that absolute maize production in 1970 was only 50 percent 
of the 1960 output. Also, yield per acre in Lesotho declined for all crops (and not only 
for maize) from 1950 to 1970. Last but not least, the Bank report dated these issues 
back to the 1930s when the colonial government had first worried about soil erosion 
(World Bank 1975:38).  
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Second, and linked to the latter historical reference in the Bank‟s report, to back his 
diagnosis of fabricated aboriginality Ferguson fielded historical data from a 1969 
publication that reprinted statistics on 1837 grain reserves listed in a 1910 entry in 
The Oxford History of South Africa (Ferguson 1990:33). Considering the Bank‟s 
attention to the history of migration and to soil erosion dating back to the 1930s, such 
evidence appears to be circumstantial at best. The issue of fabricated historical 
isolation in the Bank report that undergirds the anti-politics paradigm appears even 
more misconceived once we re-read the report with a focus on the global political 
setting and the global political economy of the 1960s and 1970s. For those were the 
years when the green revolution in agriculture introduced fertilizers and pesticides 
across the globe, when famines had ravaged across parts of the Soviet Union, the 
People‟s Republic of China, Bangladesh and across Africa and when the world food 
crisis of the early 1970s had introduced the Western industrially advanced nations to 
the fragility of global commodity chains (Wemheuer 2014; Gerlach 2008). In some 
ways, these global crises already featured prominently in the anthropological 
literature of the time – think of Marshall Sahlins analysis of how US-Americans 
rejected on moral grounds to consume horse meat in times of shortages even though 
it was a central component of the canned food they fed their dogs (Sahlins 1976) – 
and it seems rather pertinent that the Bank would address issues in Lesotho‟s 
agricultural sector and couple these with rapid population growth.  
Beyond their individual profundity, Ferguson‟s misrepresentations of the World Bank 
report point to methodological issues in the way the anti-politics machine paradigm 
addresses the historical integration of a given region into global processes. Put 
simply, the historical scope put forward to object to the World Bank‟s invention of 
Lesotho‟s economic isolation could be invoked to deconstruct any effort to change 
any nation‟s positioning in the global economy – for any such nation‟s territory will 
have had periods of full integration into regional trade at some point in its history. A 
critical anthropology of development should instead be open to consider political 
efforts to alter the unequal terms of global trade and not deconstruct such efforts per 
se. Otherwise, major global political projects are too easily excluded from the 
analysis. 
This frame of analysis should be central to how anthropology analyzes development 
after 1945, as then development became a global political project. When President 
Harry Truman inaugurated the US‟ aid programs for the Third World in famous 1949-
speech, this policy shift reflected the competition between a capitalist and a socialist 
bloc of nations over alliances with and control over the rapidly growing number of 
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postcolonial nations (Edelman and Haugerud 2005:41). In response to this bi-polar 
world order, those nations developed their own project for development in the non-
aligned movement (NAM), which culminated in the campaign for a new international 
economic order (NIEO) in the 1960s and 1970s. One core demand was to alter the 
terms of global trade, which allowed former colonial powers to buy raw materials from 
their former colonies cheaply, manufacture them into finished goods and sell those 
back at a high profit margin (Murphy 1984). The NIEO list of demands further 
included financial support for setting up manufacturing industries, sovereignty over 
natural resources, and the obligation for multi-national corporations to comply with 
national laws and labor standards. United Nations‟ agencies such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) were founded due to political pressure from the 
NAM (Neveling 2017), leading neoliberal think tanks attacked the NIEO initiative (Bair 
2009) and, somewhat ironically, aggravated exploitation in export processing zones 
spread the support of UNIDO (Neveling 2015a). The World Bank was not in favor of 
the NIEO initiative, but it was impossible for the Bank to ignore it in the 1960s and 
1970s (Sharma 2015).  
As the publication of the World Bank report on Lesotho in 1975 came at the peak of 
the NIEO initiative‟s global influence, the Bank surveyors‟ attention to the plight of 
migrant laborers and their families, to the issue of soil erosion and to the need for 
manufacturing industries should be analyzed considering the global political 
disjunctures sketched above. Given that Ferguson labeled the anti-politics machine 
paradigm as discourse analysis in Michel Foucault‟s tradition and given that to 
Foucault historical research was central for uncovering the emergence of discursive 
regimes (Foucault 2008), it seems rather surprising how Ferguson fronts Lesotho‟s 
grain reserves and exports in 1837 but shows no interest in Lesotho‟s positioning 
within the histories of competing development discourses and practices (Ziai 2015).  
In other words, Ferguson‟s claim that if a given region was integrated into a larger 
regional economy in 1837 it could not be viewed as isolated in 1975, may be 
considered as a fabrication of history as well for it seeks to refute (alleged) ahistorical 
claims to isolation and aboriginality with an ahistorical declaration of integration and 
connectivity.  
Instead, a critical anthropology of development needs to link discourse and practice 
in history and make use of the methods and analytical concepts at hand to enquire 
about the changing incorporation of a given postcolonial nation into a larger system. 
One proposal along these lines is to consider that capitalism‟s drive to maintain rates 
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of profit means that all related economic activities either face the problem of 
exhausted resources (e.g. soil erosion) or the problem of growing organizational 
power of the exploited in a given region (Silver 2003). Partly in response to these 
historical limits of accumulation and coupled with a drive towards expansion that 
establishes competing sites of production for the same commodities in different 
regions and thereby encourages relocation, capitalism on a global scale means 
regional oscillation of development and underdevelopment – a “geographical 
seesaw” that over the past several hundred years has moved regions from the 
periphery to the semi-periphery or to the center of capitalist accumulation and in the 
opposite direction (Smith 2010). With these principles in mind and with awareness 
that the anti-politics machine paradigm ignores the wider, historical political economic 
setting in which development as a political project unfolds in each time and in each 
space, the following proposes by example a critical anthropology of development that 
focuses on the global and historical intricacies of World Bank reporting and 
development policies.   
 
III. From Anti-Politics Machine to Political Economy Machinery 
 
A first step for such a critical anthropology of development is to consider the 
institutional and contractual framework between the World Bank and its member 
states and to couple this consideration with the historical conditions under which 
survey missions are commissioned, reports produced, loans recommended and 
approved and development projects and technical assistance initiated and executed. 
Mauritius shall serve as case study here. While Mauritius and Lesotho differ in 
considerable ways they also share important similarities. Lesotho is landlocked as an 
enclave within South African territory whereas Mauritius is, say, sea-locked in the 
Indian Ocean with hundreds of kilometers distance to the likewise small-island 
economies of Reunion and Madagascar. Both nations were British colonies and 
gained independence in 1966 (Lesotho) and 1968 (Mauritius), respectively. Further, 
both nations had similar demographics at independence (below 1 million), had an 
established, yet mostly unemployed industrial workforce at the time and embarked on 
development policies aiming for economic diversification from export agriculture into 
export-oriented manufacturing (Murray 1980; Neveling 2012).  
Other than in Lesotho, World Bank documentation on Mauritius began in the colonial 
period already. First came a report entitled “The Economy of Mauritius”, published on 
September 10, 1963 (World Bank 1963a). This difference of twelve years between 
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the Bank‟s first report on Mauritius and its first report on Lesotho is explained by 
institutional logic and conditions of contract. The Bank needed an “invitation” to 
survey a national or colonial territory. Such an invitation was commonly the first 
request for a project loan from a given political unit with member status in the Bretton 
Woods institutions.1 In the case of Mauritius this had happened in December 1961, 
when the British colonial government applied for a loan of 7 million USD for the 
construction of a power plant and energy supply lines for the region around the 
Mauritian capital Port Louis (World Bank 1963b:i, 1963c:1; Neveling 2012:281). 
Importantly, Bank procedures for assessing the Mauritian loan request in the 1960s 
followed the same institutional procedures and economic logics as those of the 
1970s and 1980s (e.g. World Bank 1973a, 1973b, 1982a, 1987).  
Applications for individual loans, such as that for the power plant and supply lines, 
were assessed on a case-by-case basis. Staff Appraisal Reports were based on field 
missions. These commonly included visits to project sites, interviews with 
stakeholders such as government ministries, development agencies, and local 
corporations. A positive Staff Appraisal Report was the basis for a written 
recommendation of the Bank‟s President to a committee deciding on loan approval. If 
approved, a contract between the parties was signed and filed. After project 
completion, a final report was published.2  
Besides such continuities in institutional and contractual procedures of World Bank 
lending and auditing there are important variations that stem from the wider, 
changing geopolitical setting and from a given member nation‟s positioning within 
that setting at a given time. It is these variations and their roots in contested practices 
                                                        
1
 The fact that only project-related loans were granted was the result of tense negotiations in 
Bretton Woods itself in 1944. Lending policies differed, of course, between the individual 
institutions comprising the World Bank as well as from one President to another. Other impact 
factors were credit needs of members and these were framed, for example, by the various 
regional debt crises beginning in the late 1970s or by the fact that the oil price shock of 1973 
and rising global commodity prices flushed global markets with cheap credit from private 
lenders (Rischbieter 2015; Sharma 2015; Kapur et al. 1997). 
2
  Commonly, such final reports appear many years after actual project completion. The World 
Bank Archives maintain an online repository of country reports and official project related 
documents (the said Staff Appraisal Reports, the President‟s recommendations, the loan 
agreements, and the Project Completion Reports). Judging from several years of research in 
the Bank‟s Archives this is comprehensive for any date more than twenty years past. The 
repository can be accessed here: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home (last 
accessed March 23, 2016). 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Springer in Dialectical Anthropology Vol. 41 (2), 163-183. 
Published version available from: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10624-017-9450-0  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24181/  
 
 11 
of capitalism that provide insights into the manifestations of development‟s political 
economy machinery. 
The World Bank‟s initial mission of 1962 surveyed overall economic conditions in 
Mauritius (World Bank 1963a) and thereby set in motion a ritual exercise that was 
repeated with increasing regularity. With each repetition, reports grew in scope and 
detail. The initial 50 pages report in 1963 was followed by a 55 pages report entitled 
“Current Economic Position of Mauritius” published in 1968 – the year when 
Mauritius gained independence (World Bank 1968). A 1971 report bore the same 
title, but its 148 pages offered a comprehensive update on national statistics 
comprising 100 pages (World Bank 1971). The Bank obviously regarded the 
Mauritian government‟s four-year plan of 1972 as a watershed moment in the island‟s 
political economy and produced “Mauritius: 4-Year Development Plan – An 
Assessment (in three volumes)”, comprising a 48 pages umbrella report, a 120 pages 
detailed report with 40 pages appendix, and another 105 pages report with current 
national statistics, economic indicators, and breakdowns for individual sectors (World 
Bank 1972d, 1972e, 1972c). Two years later, “Mauritius – Recent Economic 
Developments and Prospects” was a 45 pages write-up of a mid-1973 mission by two 
staffers (World Bank 1974b), while two missions – with seven researchers in April 
and May 1976 and three researchers in July and August 1977 – produced the 445-
pages “The Economy of Mauritius – A Basic Economic Report” in 1978. This, again, 
was in conversation with the Mauritian government‟s five-year-plan, now of 1976, but 
expanded the World Bank‟s assessment of the Mauritian economy in that it had four 
annexes, three of which were devoted to sectors (“The Sugar Industry in Mauritius”, 
“The Power Sector”, “The Manufacturing Sector”), and one on “The Development of 
Human Resources” (World Bank 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1978d, 1978e). In 1980, a 
234-pages “Mauritius. Recent Economic Developments and Future prospects” 
followed and added an analysis of the transport sector to the Bank‟s surveys (World 
Bank 1980b, 1980a).  
Reporting continued throughout the 1980s, but by then the tone had been set for how 
the World Bank depicted Mauritian historical integration into the global system. When 
Mauritius received Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) in 1981 and again in 1987 
(World Bank (Legal ISC Files) 1981, 1987), reporting changed substantially and now 
had shorter intervals and was produced by “joint Economic/SAL mission[s, P.N.]” of 
eleven or more members working according to criteria set out in the SAL agreements 
between Mauritius and the Bank (World Bank 1982b:Preface). Before the World 
Bank ran the nation under the SAL terms from 1981 onward, it had been one of 
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several powerful actors within a rapidly changing Mauritian political economy. This 
status of an actor amongst equals is reflected in how the Bank‟s survey missions 
reported and only gradually intervened in development policies.  
A comparison of World Bank reporting on Mauritius and on Lesotho serves to 
illustrate the Bank‟s uneven leverage across postcolonial national economies. 
Whereas the 1975 Lesotho report relied on a range of sources - colonial survey 
mission reports, the colonial and postcolonial states‟ statistical data, and independent 
Lesotho‟s first five-year plan - one reference dominated the 1963 “The Economy of 
Mauritius” World Bank report. This was a 1961 publication of the findings of a British 
colonial survey mission headed by James Edward Meade, a leading Keynesian 
economist of the day. They had been tasked to review the entire scope of Mauritian 
economic activity and to propose pathways for improving economic output so that a 
social welfare system could be put in place and funded by local tax revenues (Meade 
1961). Meade‟s key indicators for successful development were firmly rooted in a 
detailed analysis of Mauritius‟ historical integration into global trade. The 1963 Bank 
report echoed that the island needed preferential international trading agreements for 
cane sugar exports and access to global markets.  
Thus, historical fabrications of the “aboriginality” kind that Ferguson had diagnosed 
for Lesotho certainly never played a role in the World Bank‟s reporting on Mauritius. If 
anything, ignoring the island‟s plantation history and its overreliance on sugar cane 
as the only export commodity would have discredited the Bank. The Meade report 
had academic and political weight internationally and was backed by the British 
Colonial Office. Also the British public had been alerted to Mauritius‟ struggles for 
economic diversification when former governor Sir Hillary Blood demanded a “New 
Deal for Mauritius” in the London Times in 1959 (New Deal for Mauritius  04/07/1959) 
and this put World Bank activities during the 1960s into the public spotlight. As the 
World Bank report seconded Meade‟s demand for new manufacturing industries to 
substitute otherwise expensive imports it emphasized Mauritius‟ over-reliance on the 
sugar industry, “which provides 95% of exports and nearly one-third of gross-
domestic product” and had stalled since the 1950s, creating a static GDP and 
significant reduction of per capita income at a time of rapid population growth (e.g. 
World Bank 1963a:6-15).  
At the time of Mauritian independence, in 1968, the import-substitution policies that 
Meade had recommended in 1960 had been discredited in international development 
policy circles (Jenkins 1991) and the Bank‟s surveyors now put forward the 
“unavoidable question, whether the classical arsenal of protective and incentive 
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measures is sufficient”. As an alternative, they suggested to extend tax breaks and 
import-duty waivers for import-substituting industries to export industries. Export-
promotion policies in Hong Kong and Singapore were listed as best-practice 
examples (World Bank 1968:9). This substantial shift in development policy was 
executed in 1970 when Mauritius opened an export processing zone (EPZ), which 
offered the same investment incentives as zones in Hong Kong and around a dozen 
other postcolonial settings. The EPZ would make Mauritius‟ postcolonial economy 
famous. Foreign investment went through the roof in the 1980s and when EPZ 
employment peaked at around 100,000 in 1990 the island‟s official statistics 
proclaimed full employment had been achieved. World Bank reports now had titles 
such as “Mauritius: Managing Success” (World Bank 1990 [1989]) and “Mauritius: 
Expanding Horizons” (World Bank 1992). In these high-gloss reports with wide public 
circulation, Mauritius was advertised as an example that capitalist, export-oriented 
development in EPZs could work.  
The following zooms out from the World Bank‟s reporting and survey practices and 
considers which actors and institutions were behind Mauritius‟ development policy 
shift towards export-oriented industrialization in an EPZ. This also engages the new 
anthropology paradigm of development as a category of practice, in which “global” 
universalisms encounter “local” historical-cultural formations. In an extension and 
clarification of what the categories of such practice are, a historical realist perspective 
(Smith 2014) is put forward that emphasizes the relevance of historically situated 
power politics in the engagements between Mauritius, the World Bank and the global 
political economy‟s various global development universals of the 1960s and after. 
 
IV. Historical Cultural Formations in the Political Economy Machinery of Development 
 
In general, and as a development policy prerogative, EPZs (nowadays often 
relabeled as special economic zones, SEZs) were part and parcel of the US Truman 
administration‟s campaign for promoting capitalist development (instead of a turn to 
socialism) throughout the Third World in the late 1940s (Neveling 2015a). Besides 
the above-mentioned tax breaks and customs duty waivers for foreign and domestic 
investors in export-oriented manufacturing industries, such zones‟ tenders for 
manufacturing relocations featured low cost leases of land cultivated for industry and 
of turnkey factories in government-owned industrial estates. Their emergence in the 
late 1940s makes EPZs the earliest large-scale neoliberal policy in world history. In 
1970, the Mauritian EPZ was the first in Africa and came at a time when the zones 
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became a coherent global policy model promoted by a range of international 
organizations (Neveling 2015b). 
Given the World Bank‟s reputation as a pioneering institution in neoliberal 
development, it is important to note that its surveyors were skeptical about making 
the EPZ a centerpiece of Mauritian export-oriented development policy. They worried 
about the zone‟s economic feasibility because “… for a wide range of possible export 
products the cost of production in Mauritius would be much higher than the prices of 
overseas competitors” (World Bank 1968:9). This indicates that it was not the World 
Bank imposing a policy change on a postcolonial Mauritian government with limited 
capacities for negotiation as anthropologists often assume (Anders 2008), but that 
other actors and institutions from within and from outside Mauritius promoted the 
EPZ policies.  
The national parliament was already debating extensions of tax and customs 
incentives to export-industries in 1968 and many politicians came out in favor of 
these changes (Neveling 2014). Pressed by a local businessman, the British colonial 
government had informally extended preferences for import-substitution industries to 
an export-oriented jewelry and watch-making factory as early as 1965. Also, Eduard 
Lim Fat, a Mauritian economist, had conducted a government-funded survey 
missions to Hong Kong, Kaohsiung/Taiwan, Puerto Rico, Shannon/Ireland, and other 
locations with EPZs (Neveling 2014; Burn 1996). Where the World Bank surveyors 
considered Mauritius‟ relative isolation from the major global trading routes, Lim Fat 
emphasized how its remote geopolitical location made Mauritius more secure for 
capital in a time when the Cold War was escalating across Asia and Latin America 
and the ghost of revolution haunted many multi-national corporations with interests in 
the Third World. Further, he put the spotlight on Mauritius‟ low wage levels, a factor 
of production with which the local bourgeoisie was all too familiar and had enjoyed for 
the past decades already. The inaugural publication of Lim Fat‟s findings in the 
monthly outlet of the Mauritian sugar industry, PROsi magazine, and in the leading 
Mauritian agricultural science journal, Revue Agricole, show that sugar corporations 
were a target audience and that they were developing an appetite for diversifying 
their activities and actively backing, or possibly influencing, government policies (Lim 
Fat November 1969, 1969).  
This difference between local initiative and World Bank skepticism does not mean the 
Bank was outright opposed to establishing an EPZ and only came around because it 
was overwhelmed by the Mauritians‟ Schumpeterian entrepreneurial genius, as some 
researchers have argued (Bräutigam and Diolle 2009). Instead, the turn to an export-
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oriented development strategy in the EPZ and the Bank embracing that strategy was 
the product of several historical-cultural formations interacting and thereby shifting 
postcolonial Mauritian development policy from an emphasis on import-substitution 
industries to export-oriented industries. The following is an enquiry into the contested 
emergence of development policy changes over several decades.  
An early example of a historical-cultural formation intervening in development policies 
is the 1930s push by members of the Mauritian sugar plantocracy for a colonial state-
subsidized textile industry. This aloe-fiber industry involved planting sisal and 
processing it into ropes for ships and later into bags for packaging sugar (as 
documented in Chazal 1936). Competition from larger factories in India and Eastern 
Africa meant that profits did not materialize. So the entrepreneurs dumped the ailing 
import substitution industry on the colonial government‟s portfolio and operations 
continued at considerable loss until the early 1970s, mainly to secure employment for 
hundreds of workers and to maintain a second sector besides sugar (Neveling 
2012:207-224).  
The Mauritian sugar industry itself was a historical-cultural formation of longer 
duration. Sugar had been a competitive export-oriented sector since its mid-
eighteenth century emergence. Development, viewed here in a generic sense and 
not as defining a world-historical era beginning at the end of the Second World War 
(Edelman and Haugerud 2005), had come in many forms. French physiocrats had 
built a model mill on the island to encourage modernized processing in the 1700s. 
After invading the island in 1810, the incoming British colonial administration had 
supported the industry and funded scientific research into cane-breeding 
technologies since the mid-1800s. Most importantly for the industry, a series of local 
colonial administrations had, in alliance with the Mauritian Chambers of Commerce 
and Agriculture, lobbied in London for sustaining the industry‟s inhumane labor 
relations – substituting slaves with indentured laborers in the 1830s – and had 
managed to secure preferential access to London markets throughout the industry‟s 
history. Thus, when the opening of an EPZ was on the cards in the late 1960s, the 
business dynasties in the sugar sector had two centuries experience with global 
markets, international competition and labor exploitation. The major global crises of 
the 1870s and 1930s had brought bankruptcies of plantations and mills, mergers, 
and hostile take-overs and the surviving corporations were large conglomerates with 
ties of friendship, kinship, and joint shareholdership to major African multi-nationals 
of the day (Neveling 2012, 2013; Salverda 2015).  
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In the 1960s, Mauritius was thus an island with a long history of capitalist 
development, ranging from rather general economic strategies and efforts of the 
1800s to conscious planning and funding of new industrial activities since the 1930s. 
Many local institutions had emerged in the process and had been actively involved in 
this. Such institutions had regional and sometimes global networks, some of which 
stretched back over centuries. On top of this, 1950s and 1960s Mauritius was 
bustling with private clubs, secret societies and rackets, from Rotarians to 
Freemasons, while many Mauritians from the higher ranks of the state bureaucracy 
and from the economic elite had attended universities in the UK, France, and the US. 
Autobiographies and memoirs from former government ministers and expatriates 
involved in Mauritian politics describe the networking and information exchange 
between political parties, entrepreneurs, religious authorities, academics, and others 
in these spaces during the 1950s and 1960s (Cuttaree 2011; Boolell 1996; Moutou 
2001; Raman 2001).  
Such crosscutting ties between colonial capital and the postcolonial political 
leadership and the economic ambitions, knowledge and leverage commanded by 
these circles gives an important twist to the analysis of Mauritian late-colonial and 
postcolonial development. If postcolonial development policies were closely linked 
with historical accumulation and exploitation, Mauritian workers and anti-capitalist 
movements had histories and networks, too, but these could command much less 
power and influence. The following therefore considers how the Mauritian EPZ came 
about and how the World Bank engaged with it within this web of nested, multi-linear 
genealogies of capitalist historical-cultural formations.  
Once attention turns to the many earlier global ventures and industries in Mauritius 
and links these with the competing global development agendas of the Cold War, the 
World Bank‟s entry into Mauritian development policies appears in different light. 
There is neither an external institution imposing its agenda on a small-island 
postcolonial nation nor is there a single agenda on the global or on the national level. 
The challenge for a critical anthropology of development is to elaborate an encounter 
of several global development agendas – some of which had colonial legacies while 
others had early neoliberal legacies. The question then is further what difference 
lesser or stronger historical depth meant for the higher impact in the 1960s.  
That question of impact is important not least because it adds to our understanding 
why the Mauritian alliance of a landed colonial bourgeoisie in the sugar sector and an 
emerging political ruling class could take the initiative for changing national 
development policies and take the World Bank along. The first postcolonial Mauritian 
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government turned to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), an agency that had emerged from the NAM initiative in 1966 and was keen 
to establish itself as a major player in the global development circuits of the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 1969, UNIDO‟s published the recommendations of a technical 
assistance mission that had assessed the feasibility of establishing an EPZ in 
Mauritius. This was a win-win situation as it helped complete the Mauritian EPZ 
planning phase while it helped UNIDO advertise its services to other postcolonial 
nations now that one mission had been commissioned and succeeded when the EPZ 
was opened in 1970 (Neveling 2015b, 2017). 
The involvement of UNIDO in EPZ planning underlines that the World Bank was only 
one of several development agencies to which postcolonial nations could turn with 
requests for technical assistance in the late 1960s. The Mauritian government had 
the option to go “forum-shopping” among an array of institutions supporting 
development. At the same time, such institutions were eager to spread their 
developmental agendas and so they set up “shopping-forums” (von Benda-
Beckmann 1981; Lund 2006) in search of potential clients.3  
What set the World Bank apart from other development organizations was the fact 
that its policy primacy on projects, which it shared with UNIDO for example, came 
with the considerable lending capacities of one of its units, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. That lender status was most evident in the Bank‟s 
procedures for assessing projects and for backing these assessments with the kind 
of regular surveys of national political economies that have been analyzed in section 
                                                        
3
 The fact that UNIDO became active in planning the Mauritian EPZ opens another angle for a 
critical anthropology of development, which is that international institutions themselves did not 
produce consistent and coherent policy projects (for an insightful recent study on internal 
differences in the World Bank see Shakya 2011). As stated above, UNIDO was a United 
Nations agency emerging from the non-aligned movement and is generally considered to 
have supported that movement‟s initiative for a new international economic order, an order in 
which postcolonial nation-states would have enjoyed stronger sovereign rights and the 
operations of multi-national corporations would have been restricted. Instead, as I have 
shown elsewhere in detail, one section within UNIDO followed a very different agenda, one in 
which multi-national corporations saw their autonomy strengthened as postcolonial nations 
set up EPZs in order to attract foreign direct investment and earn hard currencies (such as 
US Dollar, British Pounds or German Marks) via light-industrial assembling and the export of 
finished commodities to Western markets (Neveling 2017; other recent academic works 
highlight similar variations in global policies of the socialist bloc, where several nations were 
active agents of the capitalist world economy Sanchez-Sibony 2014; Lal 2015).  
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three of this article. Rather than searching for particular turning points in these 
procedures, think 1970s anti-politics bureaucratic rationality or 1990s neoliberal-
governmentality (Anders 2005), it is advisable to consider them as rather trivial.  
With the World Bank a global development lender emerged in the 1950s, whose 
operatives to large extent were preoccupied with standard auditing procedures as 
would happen before any lending operation was completed even on the level of a 
household buying new property. What made these operations so powerful was that 
they were inserted into an inter-state system shaken up by anti-colonial movements 
in the aftermath of the Second World War. The offer of credit lines for development 
policies and their backing by a number of advanced capitalist nation-states provided 
a lifeline to political and economic ruling classes in many postcolonial nations 
(Landsberg 1979). While these classes had the know-how and networks to plan 
development policies and survey missions, World Bank credit lines allowed them to 
keep the financial risk for new projects out of their own corporate budgets and 
instead bill the new postcolonial national economies and budgets for industrial 
development projects that barely created basic standards of living. 
Seen from this angle, World Bank development programs have always been about 
politics and national and regional political economies. This does not mean, of course, 
that the Bank did not use its project lending to intervene in a given nation‟s way of 
regulating, measuring and organizing its political economy. Instead, in Mauritius this 
happened not as a hidden transcript but in explicit and well-documented ways and 
had considerable impact on the balance of power between capital and the state. The 
above mentioned 1971 report on the “Current Economic Position of Mauritius” 
mentions a significant World Bank intervention in government planning: 
 
“Since May 1970, the World Bank has seconded to the Government a director 
for the Economic Planning Unit. A number of experts, some of them 
expatriates, have recently joined the unit. It is expected that a five year plan, at 
least in a draft form, will be available in mid 1971.“ (World Bank 1971:33) 
 
This highlights that the World Bank was, from early on, capable of inserting its own 
personal into key-positions within the Mauritian bureaucracy. The Bank‟s three-
volume compendium of the Mauritian government‟s 1972 five-year-plan discussed in 
section three was, considering the above quote, not only an evaluation of an 
independently designed document but an evaluation as to whether the collaboration 
between the Bank‟s seconded personnel and the Mauritian civil servants had been 
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successful. Similarly, major changes in the Mauritian government‟s calculus of 
development funding, such as a shift from a general emphasis on creating 
employment towards an emphasis on “productive employment” that “increases output 
and therefore total income” in the 1972 five-year-plan (World Bank 1972c:i), may well 
be attributed to the entry of Bank personnel into Mauritian government rank and file.  
While details on the negotiations and debates preceding such shifts would require 
long-term research in the World Bank archives, the impact of the Bank‟s financing of 
Mauritian government EPZ operations is easier to assess. One major expense was 
the construction of industrial estates and the cultivation of land for industry. For this, 
the Mauritian government requested a series of loans from the World Bank in the 
1970s and 1980s. Although the government acted as debtor and guarantor the World 
Bank made it a condition that the loans were released to and expenditures controlled 
by the Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM).  
This reveals another set of historical-cultural formations in the financial sector and 
how these became entangled in the era of the Cold War and post-colonial 
development. The DBM had been established on January 1st, 1964 in a merger of the 
Mauritius Agricultural Bank (MAB) and the Mauritius Housing Corporation (MHC). 
The MAB had been founded by the British colonial government in 1937 to bail out 
larger sugar estates and mills during the crisis of the 1930s and had since been a 
central instrument for economic policy initiatives of the colonial state. The MHC was 
the product of the 1950s British colonial development initiative that also included the 
Meade report and had been tasked with the construction of large-scale working class 
housing estates. The DBM‟s annual reports of the 1960s showcased housing 
construction and investment in new machineries for the sugar industry. Yet, more 
emphasis was given to funding for import-substitution industries such as a factory for 
toothpaste, intended as “the first step in an effort to produce a wide range of 
cosmetics [sic] locally”. The DBM also invested in the first air-conditioned beach hotel 
and thus, in some way, pioneered what today is Mauritius‟ major economic sector, 
tourism. Even the “modern factory for processing of precision jewels used in watch 
movements” that would serve as a best-practice example for the turn towards export-
oriented development from 1965 onwards was part sponsored by the DBM and 
advertised as requiring “a combination of fine machinery and skilled Mauritians” 
(Development Bank of Mauritius 1967:no pagination for pictures and subtitles).  
The World Bank first evaluated the DBM and then required the postcolonial Mauritian 
government to put the DBM in charge of overseeing the disbursement of all credit 
lines attached to export-promotion policies in the EPZ. For the evaluation, the Bank 
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hired Dr. Phiroze B. Medhora of the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India, who had already “visited Mauritius in 1962 to advise on the setting up of this 
Bank” (Development Bank of Mauritius 1971:3). Thus, the World Bank channeled its 
money via a British colonial structure and commissioned British colonial personnel at 
the very moment when its lending capacities made it the most powerful actors in 
development planning. As the Mauritian government borrowed more and more 
millions of US-dollars for EPZ-infrastructure and investment incentives throughout the 
1970s, the World Bank helped another Mauritian historical-cultural formation gain 
oversight over loan money that the postcolonial government guaranteed.  
One condition for releasing the loans was that the DBM enjoyed “greater 
independence from the Government”. A survey mission suggested that World Bank 
credits should only be granted to Mauritius if the DBM became an “eligible” recipient 
and requested that the Mauritian government provided the DBM with share capital, 
that the Board of Directors was enlarged so that private sector members had a 
majority vote of seven over five government appointed members, and that a new 
General Manager, an individual of the World Bank‟s choosing who had been director 
of the Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., was appointed (World Bank 
1972a:5).  
In sum this meant that once the World Bank embraced Mauritian EPZ policies, the 
facilitation of credit lines enabled its staff to push through a part-privatization of the 
DBM. That “new” organization then became the caretaker for the most expensive and 
most significant development program of the young postcolonial Mauritian state. The 
DBM thus amalgamated a range of historical-cultural formations, the late colonial 
development bank, capitalists from the Mauritian private sector, and Indian 
development experts of the World Bank‟s choosing to form a new formation.  
Soon, the developed its own interpretation of how World Bank development policies 
and Mauritian government development policies related. The first DBM annual report 
under the auspices of the new general manager met the criteria of an anti-politics 
style fabrication of historical isolation as it slid over the Mauritian private sector‟s role 
in the making of the EPZ and instead evoked that Mauritian “development of export 
oriented industries is very much in line with the ideas expressed by Mr. Mac Namara, 
President of the World Bank at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.” (Development Bank of Mauritius 1972:5).  
If anything, this fabrication gilded the historical process whereby historical-cultural 
formations from within Mauritius had pushed for the creation and funding of an EPZ. 
Instead, the DBM now created an image of Mauritius as model student of World Bank 
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policy recommendations. On its part, the World Bank ensured that the DBM would 
become the star and the key of export-oriented development policies, and did so with 
a considerable level of autonomy. Within only two years of auditing DBM-operations, 
the World Bank had altered the shareholder structure and institutional layout 
significantly. An enlarged board of twelve directors now gave the instigators of the 
EPZ, the Mauritian private sector, a majority of seven over five government 
representatives (World Bank 1974a:7-8).  
At the end of that short maneuver, the World Bank and the Mauritian private sector 
controlled millions of US-dollars of public debt and disbursed that debt to build 
infrastructure and grant investment incentives to an increasing number of joint 
ventures between Mauritian and foreign corporation operating in the EPZ. Mauritian 
EPZ workers instead lived through years of highly exploitative and abusive labor 
relations while the governments they elected kept applying for more World Bank 
loans to build more industrial zones and grant more incentives to EPZ investors.  
At the end of the 1970s, the Mauritian state was approaching bankruptcy, not least 
because World Bank loans channeled towards the DBM could no longer be repaid. 
Structural adjustment loans again altered the modus operandi of the political 
economy machinery and demoted the DBM to a caretaker role for small and medium 
enterprises in 1988. New institutions such as the Mauritius Export Processing Zones 
Development Authority took charge of EPZ investment and policies and the Mauritius 
Housing Corporation was outsourced and its services privatized and transferred to 
the New Housing Development Corporation. In the 2000s, an institution called 
Enterprise Mauritius took over EPZ-operations and the wheels of the political 
economy machinery that is development will certainly keep rolling on in Mauritius 
(Neveling 2012). 
 
IV. Development‟s political-economy machinery 
 
This article has proposed and tested a historical-materialist approach to the 
anthropology of development as an alternative to prevailing approaches in the 
discipline. One such approach, commonly associated with Ferguson‟s seminal anti-
politics machine, considers development as a discourse-driven power politics 
sustaining Western supremacy over postcolonial nations. The need for development 
is established via a fabrication of histories of economic isolation and by promulgating 
de-politicized understandings of the (postcolonial) nation-state. However, a 
reassessment of World Bank reporting on Lesotho reveals that Ferguson 
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exaggerated the scale of historical fabrication and at the same time ignored the 
geopolitical setting of the Cold War and the existence of competing models of 
development in the 1970s, especially so the non-aligned movement‟s vision for a 
new international economic order. Once anthropology establishes a paradigm that 
researches the competing development agendas in world historical periods, 
development no longer can be framed as an anti-politics machine but as political 
economy machinery. That machinery is put in motion by the frictions and gravitations 
created when local, national and global historical-cultural formations engage in 
practices that seek to alter the positioning of a given political economy within a 
dynamic global system.  
Such an understanding does not imply that development is a generic historical 
category. Instead, it nurtures an advanced and critical anthropological understanding 
of historical particularities. This highlights that there is something very particular to 
the period since the Second World War. With the onset of the Cold War, 
development was no longer only a category of practice but also a discursive 
category. As the examples discussed in this article show, development after 1949 
turns into a dynamic set of contested practices aimed at changing the global political 
economy. These practices were further refined and sometimes amalgamated as they 
engaged historical-cultural formations that were the product of world making projects 
and promises of universalism of earlier eras and other spaces. The genealogies of 
these formations date back to colonial and imperial policies and economies. They 
embody the experience of earlier global crises or may be the product thereof. Seen in 
this light, development as a category of practice maintains or amends long-existing 
practices of capitalist accumulation and is central to how global, national and local 
political economies change. One manifestation of this political economy machinery is 
the globalization of industrial manufacturing in export processing zones.  
This does not preclude that the political economy machinery of development always 
generates something that works in favor of capitalism and prevents outright conflict. 
What is important is that an analysis of the encounter between the synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions of competing capitalist practices engaging in the political 
economic machinery that is development turns our attention to the fact that some of 
the most powerful, most world-making historical-cultural formations involved in 
development are majorly concerned with capitalist exploitation. Development thus 
emerges as one manifestation of capitalism‟s political economy machinery that is 
indeed best studied as a category of contested practice.  
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